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24 May 1962


MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR/INTELLIGENCE
(Attention:)

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SUBJECT : O/NE Comments on 21 May draft paper on
"CIA Support of U. S. Counterinsurgency Operations"

1. Much of this paper looks reasonable to us. As a general comment, however, we are bothered here, as in other papers on this subject, by what seems to us a lack of clear guidance and rigorous thinking about what counterinsurgency is and, no less important, what it is not. In our view, it should be made clear that there are a number of potentially turbulent situations, in which friendly or neutral regimes might find themselves faced with violent domestic challenges, but which are not, or should not be considered as, counterinsurgency problems for the U. S. within the meaning of the term as here used.

2. Lacking this caveat, the paper can too easily be interpreted as an exhortation to the Agency (and the government generally) to attempt to assume responsibility for suppressing violence and maintaining and guiding incumbent regimes of various sorts in many places where this probably cannot be done or should not be tried. In short, counterinsurgency against Communists or pro-Communists is one thing; counterinsurgency against other

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dissident factions is another. We do not argue that the U. S. should in no case attempt the latter, but it should consider the effort only after a very searching examination of the merits -- including the local issues, the question of where real U. S. interests lie, and the feasibility of an action program sufficient to gain results. This document omits this very real need.

3. Our specific comments and suggestions concern the references to DDI functions and to the tone of the treatment of intelligence production responsibilities. After correctly pointing out (para. 3b, page 3) that the USIB is actively considering how to handle the counterinsurgency requirement, the paper goes on to ordain that the U. S. intelligence effort will be "aligned in support of counterinsurgency operations." This language is repeated in para. 6b (page 11), which states that, "as a matter of priority" CIA will act to "realign the collection and production effort of the U. S. intelligence community, as necessary," to provide estimates and studies which (a) "identify those countries which are vulnerable to insurgency"; (b) "analyze the nature and scope of the insurgency problem in each country"; and (c) "appraise the consequences of overt U. S. action . . . in supporting the counterinsurgency effort."

4. The net effect is to convey the idea that support of counterinsurgency operations is an overriding objective of intelligence production, with everything else taking a back seat. We don't

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know how the USIB will finally decide on the problem but our own thinking is that: (a) much of the intelligence required for counterinsurgency operations is already available or will more or less automatically be provided under existing production patterns; (b) the counterinsurgency planners and operators represent but one of a number of overlapping groups of planners, operators, and decision-makers requiring intelligence community support; (c) a great deal of the close intelligence support for counterinsurgency is of a departmental rather than national type and to divert the latter would in many instances be misapplied effort; and (d) the intelligence community should not leap into a large-scale program for supporting counterinsurgency planning and operations but should rather base its response on actual requirements case by case. This last point applies particularly to the USIB's estimative machinery, which will of course take due account of the insurgency question in countries where it is a problem, but the machinery is designed to support national level policy formulation and cannot and should not attempt to provide full estimative treatment of insurgency worldwide as a basis for lower level contingency planning.

5. At least until General Carter's committee, USIB, and finally the Director have made up their minds on what directives should be given the intelligence community for support of

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counterinsurgency operations, it would probably be best to restate the pertinent passages in the present draft in more general terms. Specifically, we would suggest the following changes:

Page 3, para. 3b.

Reverse the two subparagraphs, rewording present subpara. (2) as follows:

"The U. S. intelligence community will take appropriate action to provide the intelligence required to support counterinsurgency planning and operations." (NOTE: Reference to "all levels of U. S. operational responsibility" deleted because of the difficulty of sorting out how much of the intelligence needed for actual field operations would be provided by the intelligence community's present resources and how much by intelligence elements within the counterinsurgency field headquarters. The reference to the Objectives is unnecessary.)

Page 11, para. 6b(1).

Revise as follows:

"(1) Review with the USIB the collection and production effort of the U. S. intelligence community, taking such steps as are necessary to insure that counterinsurgency planners and operators are provided with:

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
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(a) adequate intelligence guidance in identifying situations requiring U. S. counterinsurgency planning or action, in formulating realistic plans, and in weighing alternative courses of action;

(b) the basic and current intelligence needed for detailed planning and operations;

(c) adequate means for handling special counterinsurgency intelligence collection requirements."

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